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Fundamental Rights and Judicial Cooperation in the  
Decisions of the Court of Justice on the Brussels I Regulation 2009-
2014:  
The Story So Far. 
 
Lorna Gillies 1 
University of Leicester 
 
Introduction 
 “ QĂƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĂƚĞŽĨĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽĨŽƌĐĞŽĨƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨ>ŝƐďŽŶ ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ
fundamental principles of EU law and the EU system of judicial protection such as 
primacy, direct application, direct effect and interpretation in conformity, have 
become ŽĨĨƵůůĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĚŽŵĂŝŶŽĨƚŚĞ&^: ? ?2 
Ever since the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights, fundamental rights 
have operated at and between national and EU law. 3 With the enactment of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights via (inter alia) Article 67, Title V of the TFEU, a further layer of 
fundamental rights has emerged.  The Charter addresses the protection of six key rights, one 
of which is justice. As justice is a broad concept, for present purposes it is useful to identify 
those particular aspects of the Charter aligned with justice in a specific context. The relevant 
aspects of the Charter are Articles 6, on the preservation of individual liberty and security of 
person and Article 47 on the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. The emergence of 
the Charter as a source of fundamental rights law provides an opportunity to consider and 
determine the tripartite 4 relationship between national human rights law, EU law (including 
human rights law) and the Charter.  This paper is focussed on the extent to which the Court 
of Justice is increasingly having regard to the Charter when interpreting secondary EU laws 5 
in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters. The extent to which such EU laws are 
                                                          
1 Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Leicester, LE1 7RH. 
2 J. ĚĞǁĂĂŶ ? “dŚĞEĞǁ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚ,ŽŵĞĨĨĂŝƌƐ PdŽǁĂƌĚƐ&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ^ƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ŝŶ^ ?
Wolff, F.A.N.J. Goudappel and J. W. de Zwaan (eds) Freedom, Security and Justice After Lisbon and Stockholm, 
TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2011 at p.25. 
3 H.S. ZĂƵůƵƐ ? “&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĂŽĨ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?in S. Wolff, F.A.N.J. 
Goudappel and J. W. de Zwaan (eds) n 2 supra. 
4 C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v Andr&eacute Bamberski 2000 ECR I-01935 at para 25;  ?:ƵƌĂƚŽǁŝƚĐŚ ? ?dŚĞ
EƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚŶŐůŝƐŚWƌŝǀĂƚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ):ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨWƌŝǀĂƚĞ
International Law, 173 at p.188. 
5 C-483/11 Boncea and Others, Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 14 December 2011, [2011] ECR I-00198 and 
C-617/10 REC Åkerberg Fransson, Order of the Court (Grand Chamber), 7 May 2013 (unreported). 
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interpreted in accordance with the Charter demonstrates a particular aspect of the h ?Ɛ “ƌŽůĞ
 ? Q ? ŝŶ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƌŝŐŚƚ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ?6  In essence, the introduction of the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the policy objectives it seeks to achieve necessitate a coherent approach to 
embedding the Charter across the  “EU constitutional legal order. ?7  Raulus recently 
concluded that due regard to the Charter required to be demonstrated through a 
combination of  “ƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? Q ?ũƵĚŝĐŝĂůƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨhůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞĂĐĐession of the 
hƚŽƚŚĞ,Z ? ?8 In response to the second point  W namely judicial review of EU law- it  is 
necessary to consider how the Court of Justice ?Ɛjurisprudence 9 on the interpretation of 
secondary EU laws is increasingly taking account of fundamental rights in the Charter. 
In December 2014, five years will have passed since the enactment of both the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. During that time, attention has focussed on 
the role of the CJEU and its role in supporting a particular policy objective of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, namely the establishment of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for the 
protection of EU citizens. In accordance with Article 81, a key aspect of that policy is the 
establishment of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters between the Member 
States through the approximation of laws and rules of jurisdiction. This policy is related to 
particular objectives in the Charter related to justice in the context of the right to access a 
court and an appropriate remedy (Articles 6 and 47).  Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
key measures taken in the related field of Justice and Home Affairs were the Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 and the Rome Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980.  Whilst both instruments were 
ĞŶĂĐƚĞĚĂŶĚƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?10 the justification for their introduction, 
                                                          
6 H.S. Raulus, in S. Wolff, F.A.N.J. Goudappel and J. W. de Zwaan (eds), n 2 at p.214. 
7 G. ^ĂŶŶĂ ? “ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞhŚĂƌƚĞƌŽĨ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ/ƚƐ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽŶ:ƵĚŝĐŝal Cooperation in Civil 
ĂŶĚŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůDĂƚƚĞƌƐ ? ?ŝŶ' ?ŝ&ĞĚĞƌŝĐŽ ?ĞĚ ) ?The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights From Declaration to 
Binding Instrument, Springer, Dordrecht, 2011 at p.161. 
8 Raulus, in S. Wolff, F.A.N.J. Goudappel and J. W. de Zwaan (eds), n 2 at p.240. 
9 s ?dƌƐƚĞŶũĂŬĂŶĚ ?ĞǇƐĞŶ ? “dŚĞ'ƌŽǁŝŶŐKǀĞƌůĂƉŽĨ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů&ƌĞĞĚŽŵƐĂŶĚ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ
Case->ĂǁŽĨƚŚĞ:h ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )>Z ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞ “ŽǀĞƌůĂƉŽĨĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƐ
ĂŶĚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ “Ăpplication and observance ?ŽĨĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂƚƉ ? ? ? ?, word itallicised 
for emphasis. 
10 Some Member States enacted and regarded these measures as equivalent to  “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?^ ?
Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd ed, Oxford: University Press, 2011 at p.9-10, ; W ?D ?EŽƌƚŚ ? “dŚĞ
 ? ?ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ>ĂǁƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞƚŽŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůKďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) P/ƚƐ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚDĂŝŶ&ĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?ŝŶW ?
M. North, (ed), Contract Conflicts The EEC convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: A 
Comparative Study, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1982 at p.11-12. 
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11 was to support the objectives of the EC at the time.  12 Therefore, the interpretation of both 
instruments was not strictly focussed on ensuring compatibility with human or fundamental 
rights per se.  Given the transference of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters 
from the third to the first pillar by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has had competence to 
conclude secondary EU legislation operating between the Member States. 13 Article 81 of the 
Treaty confirms that judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters between the 
Member States is required  “ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?Whilst the requirement for necessity is regarded by Peers as less debatable in terms 
of satisfying the internal market requirement, 14 it must still nevertheless be established that 
measures to be taken at EU level cannot better be taken by the Member States.  What this 
means is that the EU Commission must demonstrate two things.  First, it must be 
demonstrated that continued divergences ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
laws affect one of the four freedoms.  Second, action by the EU to reduce divergences through 
the introduction of approximated EU laws must be proportionate.  Since 2002, in order to 
address continued divergences, the EU has enacted a number of Regulations in EU private 
international law.  The most prominent measures in the field of EU private international law 
are the Brussels I Regulation for Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters,15 the Brussels 
IIa Regulation for Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters and Child Custody 16 and the Rome I 17 
and Rome II 18  Regulations on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual 
Obligations respectively.  In particular the Brussels I Regulation seeks to provide a coherent 
set of general, exclusive and special jurisdiction rules for civil and commercial disputes.  A 
hierarchy of jurisdiction rules (exclusive, general and special) in the Brussels I Regulation 
                                                          
11  “ZĞƉŽƌƚďǇDƌ ?W ?:ĞŶĂƌĚŽŶƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďƌ ? ? ? ?ŽŶũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŝŶĐŝǀŝůĂŶĚĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? 1979 OJ C59/1  ? “ŽƵŶĐŝůZĞƉŽƌƚŽŶƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ
on the law applicable to contractual obligatiŽŶƐ ?ďǇWƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌƐDĂƌŝŽ'ŝƵůŝĂŶŽĂŶĚWĂƵů>ĂŐĂƌĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?K:
C282. 
12 W ?ƌĂŝŐ ? “dŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ:ĂŶĚEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƵƌƚƐ ? ?ŝŶƐŚŝĂŐďŽƌ ?E ?ŽƵŶƚŽƵƌŝƐĂŶĚ/ ?>ŝĂŶŽƐ ?ĞĚƐ ) ?The
European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon, Cambridge: University Press, 2012 at p.79. 
13 The Lugano Opinion also equips the EU with external competence to enter into agreements with non EU 
Member States, on behalf of the Member States;  “Opinion 1/03 of the Court on the competence of the 
Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters ? ?[2006] ECR I-1145. 
14 Peers, n 10 at p.605.  
15 EC 44/2001 OJ 2001 L12; cf to be replaced by EC 1215/2012 OJ 2012 L351/1, effective from 10/01/15. 
16 EC 2201/2003 OJ 2003 L338/1. 
17 EC 593/2008 OJ 2008 L177/6. 
18 EC 864/2007 OJ 2007 L199/40. 
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determines whether a defendant domiciled in one Member State may be sued in the courts 
of another Member State.  In addition, the Brussels I Regulation contains rules on when 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments can be automatically permitted or 
refused.  The Brussels IIa Regulation also seeks to provide a set of coherent jurisdiction rules 
for matrimonial matters and for disputes relating to parental responsibility.  The Rome I and 
II Regulations contain rules which determine what law applies to a contractual or non-
contractual obligation respectively and when the ůĞǆĨŽƌŝ ?Ɛ public policy or mandatory rules 
may be enforced to restrict the applicable law. 19  It is worth noting of these four Regulations, 
it is only (currently) the Brussels IIa Regulation which ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽ  “ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? Q ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ? Q ?ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
fundamental rights of the chilĚĂƐƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ Q ?20   
The CJEU has continued to provide autonomous and independent interpretations to ensure 
consistency with the objectives of these secondary EU instruments.  However, the enactment 
of the Charter in 2009 and the advancement towards accession of the ECHR by the EU 21 
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĞƵƌĐĂ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚĚƵĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂŶĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌƐŚŽƵůĚ
be demonstrated ŝŶƚŚĞ:h ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?inter alia) greater regard for the reasoning 
offered in AGƐ ? Opinions. 22  Generally speaking, tŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ ?'ĞŶĞƌĂůŽĨĨĞƌ
a significant insight into the ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛgeneral  “ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŽƌǇ role. ? 23  More specifically, the 
decisions of the Court of Justice on the Brussels I Regulation continue to march towards an 
increasingly particularised jurisprudential framework for the autonomous interpretation of 
EU private international laws.  As Trstenjkak and Beysen ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ
concludes, the key developments ůŝĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞŶŝŶŐ Žƌ  “ŐƌĂĚƵĂů ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ?24  of 
                                                          
19 Cf Juratowitch, n 4 at p.193 on the application of foreign law and compliance with the ECHR. 
20 Recital 33, Regulation EC 2201/2003, n16 ; Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz [2010] 
ECR -14247, paragraph 59 et seq ; C-400/10 J Mc B. v L.E. 2010 ECR I-08965 ; C-4/14 Bohez v Wiertz: 6 January 
2014 (Request for Preliminary Ruling). It must also be noted that in January 2015, the Brussels I Regulation will 
be replaced by Regulation EC 1215/2012, the Brussels I Recast Regulation. Recital 38 of that Regulation also 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐ “ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ; Recital 38, Regulation EC 1215/2012, OJ L351/1 
at p.5 
21 Article 6 TEU ; W ?ƌĂŝŐ ? “hĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ,Z PŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ?WƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞĂŶĚ^ƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
Fordham International Law Journal 1115; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No.4/2014: available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354975 (accessed September 2014) at p.1114-1118. 
22 ' ?ĞƵƌĐĂ ? ?ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞhŚĂƌƚĞƌŽĨ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ PŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞĂƐĂ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ
ĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ ? ?2013 20(2) Maastricht J of European and Comparative Law 168 at p.169. 
23 A. Kaczorowska, European Union Law, 3rd ed, Routledge, 2013 at p.40. 
24 Trstenjkak and Beysen, n 9 at p.294. 
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ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ďƵƚ ĐƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ĂůƐŽ  “adjustments  ? Q ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ ŽĨ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ
restrictions of those rights  Q ? 25  Accordingly, this chapter seeks to review a number of key 
CJEU cases on the Brussels I Regulation issued by the court in the period 2009-2014.  It will be 
considered first, to what extent those recent decisions are first illustrative of that  “ŐƌĂĚƵĂů
ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ? 26 towards a lex specialis in field of judicial cooperation generally and second how 
justice is taken account as a fundamental right ŝŶƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛdecisions. Where available, the 
' ?ƐKƉŝŶŝŽŶs should continue to shed light on the future influence of the Charter in seeking 
to achieve autonomous, independent interpretations of the emerging set of EU private 
international laws. 
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Title IV of Treaty and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
WƌŝǀĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁƌƵůĞƐĂƌĞĂƐĞƚŽĨ “ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ?27  which determine what court 
is competent to hear a dispute (jurisdiction) and which country's laws apply (lex fori, lex loci). 
These rules have been developed and interpreted by and between sovereign jurisdictions in 
ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ<ĞŐĞůŝĂŶŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ “ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?28; namely certainty and predictability with 
due regard to the mutual principles of comity and reciprocity (trust and confidence) when 
recognising and enforcing judgments from other sovereign States. Since its inception, the EU 
moved forward with the  “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?29  of jurisdiction rules and the reciprocal 
enforcement of judgments between the Member States. This has continued apace with a 
more far reaching ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ŽĨ ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƌƵůĞƐ ŽĨ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
international laws via (inter alia) the secondary EU instruments mentioned earlier, in 
furtherance of the policy to establish an  “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ?  (AFSJ). 
Raulus has confirmed that there is Ă  “ĐůŽƐĞ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ &^: ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ Q ?30 Since the Tampere Council in 1999, 31 the establishment of an Area 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 A. Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, Justice, Pluarlism and Subsidiarity in the 
International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law, Cambridge: University Press, 2010 at p.19-20. 
28 ' ? <ĞŐĞů  ?&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ? ?  ŝŶ < ? >ŝƉƐƚĞŝŶ  ?ĞĚ ) ?International Encyclopedia of International Law, 
Volume III/1, Private International Law, Mohr Siebeck - Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2011. 
29 P. Graziano and M. P. Vink, Europeanization New Research Agendas, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2007. 
30 Raulus, in S. Wolff, F.A.N.J. Goudappel and J. W. de Zwaan (eds), n 2 at p.229. 
31 Kazcarowska, n 23 at p.44. 
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ŽĨ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞǁĂƐĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚĂƐĂ “ŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? 32 of 
the EU. The AFSJ is an explicit objective of the Treaty of Lisbon, the TFEU and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides, inter alia ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “hŶŝŽŶƐŚĂůů
offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which 
ƚŚĞĨƌĞĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶƐŝƐĞŶƐƵƌĞĚ Q ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞd&hconfirms that the AFSJ is an 
ĂƌĞĂŽĨ “ƐŚĂƌĞĚĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ Q ?The Preamble of 
the Charter states ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĂƌĞĂŽĨĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚhĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?Measures taken by the EU in the field of AFSJ must 
be within the realms of ƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛcompetence.  In its desire to approximate jurisdiction 
rules in civil and commercial matters, the EU has taken action to update existing secondary 
EU laws and introduce new measures.  Since (inter alia) the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and 
ŵŽƌĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ƌƚŝĐůĞƐ  ? ? ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ d&h ? ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ŽĨ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝŶŐ
autonomous, independent and arguably more particularised interpretations of these 
Regulations has continued to exert considerable influence on the evolution and interpretation 
of private international laws - on the one hand pragmatically viewed as the remit of sovereign 
states but on the other hand regarded as an emerging branch of EU private law. 33   
The cornerstone of AFSJ is the principle of ŵƵƚƵĂůƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?laws and 
procedures. The principle of mutual recognition, derived from the Court of Justice in Cassis 
de Dijon, 34 has ensured that Member States respect and recognise the rules and procedures 
of other Member States. This principle must be balanced with the general objective of the 
AFSJ where ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ “ƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ?ďǇŽƚŚĞƌDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Union law, and, iŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? 35  The discrete question that has arisen from a 
number of CJEU decisions on judicial cooperation is whether mutual recognition is 
 “ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?? 36  In the field of judicial 
cooperation, the two broad areas where the tension between mutual recognition and 
fundamental rights has arisen have been either when applying the Regulations for the 
                                                          
32 Kaczarowska, n 23 at p.41. 
33 P.Letto-Vanamo and J. Smits (eds), Coherence and Fragmentation in European Private Law, Sellier: European 
Law Publishers, Munich, 2012. 
34 C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG V Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. 
35 J. Polakiewicz ? “dŚĞh>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞ,Z PtŝůůƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ^ƋƵĂƌĞƚŚĞŝƌĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )
EHRLR 592 at Ɖ ? ? ? ?ƋƵŽƚŝŶŐ'dƌƐƚĞŶũĂŬ ?ƐKƉŝŶŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞJoined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S 22 5 
October 2010 (not yet published) at paras 38, 41. 
36 Raulus, in S. Wolff, F.A.N.J. Goudappel and J. W. de Zwaan (eds), n 2 at p.229. 
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purposes of establishing jurisdiction in the courts of a Member State or in determining in what 
circumstances recognitioŶ ĂŶĚ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚcan 
legitimately be refused.  More specifically, the cases on the Brussels I Regulation to be 
considered later in this paper reflect the need for greater coherence between the potentially 
competing notions of mutual recognition, effective judicial cooperation and rights enshrined 
under the ECHR and the Charter.  This has also been reflected in cases on the analogous 
Brussels IIa Regulation on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in matrimonial matters 
and parental responsibility.  For example, in C-400/10 PPU McB, the CJEU confirmed that it 
was able to take account of the Charter when interpreting Brussels II Regulation. 37  The Court 
of Justice confirmed that the Charter should apply if mutatis mundandis with the ECHR.   
In the context of judicial cooperation for civil and commercial matters, the challenge of 
reconciling mutual recognition with fundamental rights protection persists. Therefore, 
considering the decisions of the CJEU ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĂŶĚ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞ in its interpretation of EU 
private international laws provides an opportunity to reflect on how the objectives of mutual 
recognition correlate with first the increasing expectations of fundamental rights protection 
via the application of Article 6 and 47 of the Charter and Article 67(1) of the TFEU.  In a series 
of judgments prior to and since the introduction of the Charter, the CJEU has affirmed that 
the principle of mutual recognition cannot be applied at the expense of fundamental rights 
derived either from the ECHR or the Charter.  Rodgerson identifies that the use of Article 6 of 
the ECHR in particular ǁŝůůŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ “ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŽƌĞŝŐŶũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚ
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ?,Z ? ? 38 In the AFJS, a more far reaching question 
posed by Polakiewicz is whether  “ŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?,ZŽƌ
EU law, may be invoked to refuse mutual recognition in cases where the relevant EU 
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨŽƌƐƵĐŚĂƌĞĨƵƐĂůŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?39  The next section of this Chapter 
will consider how particular decisions on the Brussels I Regulation by the CJEU during the 
period 2009-2014 demonstrate the emergence of De Burca ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĂŶĚƚŚŝƌĚƉŽŝŶƚƐ on the 
                                                          
37 C-400/10 PPU J. McB v L.E. n 20 ; S. Barriati, Cases and Materials on EU Private International Law, Hart, 
Oxford, 2011 at p.193-194. 
38 P. Rogerson, ŽůůŝĞƌ ?ƐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŽĨ>ĂǁƐ, 4th ed, Cambridge: University Press at p.431. 
39 J. Polakiewicz ? “dŚĞh>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞ,Z PtŝůůƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ^ƋƵĂƌĞƚŚĞŝƌĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )
EHRLR 592 at p.603. Word italicised for emphasis. 
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metamorphosis of the Charter, beyond its  “ĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ Q ?to its] cit[ation] or argu[ment] before 
ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ Q ?ĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐ ?ŵĞŶƚ ? QĂŶĚ QƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞ Q  ? 40  
A Gradual Expansion: Decisions of the Court of Justice to the Brussels I Regulation and the 
Charter 
Before turning to the approach in recent CJEU cases, it is instructive to briefly consider the 
extent to which the pre-Lisbon and Charter case law from the Court of Justice considered the 
notion of fundamental rights, derived from interpretation of the ECHR, in its interpretation of 
both the Brussels Convention 1968 and the Brussels I Regulation. At this juncture, the 
distinction must be made between those cases which fall under the scope of the EU rules and 
ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƌĞƐŝĚƵĂů ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂů
mechanisms.  Not only does this distinction define the temporal scope of the Regulations 
between the Member States, it also serves to highlight that the Charter ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ
restricted to the  “EU legal order. ? 41  The key cases in which the provisions of the ECHR have 
arisen under the Brussels Convention and Regulation are in relation to the restrictive review 
of ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛjurisdiction, the compatibility of provisional and protective measures and the 
extent to which a foreign judgment may be refused recognition and enforcement. These will 
now be considered in turn. 
C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v Andre Bamberski : Does Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment 
Infringe a Fundamental Right? 
The case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v Andre Bamberski 42 illustrates the role of the Court in the 
tripartite relationship between national law, the Brussels Convention 1968 and fundamental 
rights under the ECHR.  The core issue was whether a judgment from one MS could, under 
Article 27 of the Convention, be refused recognition in another Member State.  In this case, 
the defendant was not present to be able to defend (inter alia) civil proceedings which took 
place in France.  A judgment was issued against him which required him to pay compensation.  
The French judgment was sought to be enforced in Germany.  In response, refusal to enforce 
                                                          
40 De Burca, n 22 at p.168. 
41 ^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ> ?& ?D ?ĞƐƐĞůŝŶŬ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal [2013] 
Y ? ? ? ?ŝŶ “dŚĞWĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐŽĨŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨůŝĐƚĨƚĞƌDĞůůŽŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ? at p.537, 539, 541. On 
national approaches, with English private international law as an exemplar, see Juratowitch n 4. 
42 C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v Andre Bamberski OJ 2000 C163/1. 
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the judgment ǁĂƐ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ  “ƵŶĂďůĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ƚŽ
defend himself. ?43  Article 27 provided that refusal to enforce could only be permitted if 
enforcement was contrary to public policy.  The Court of Justice held that whilst it was not 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƌĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚŽĨŽƌŝŐŝŶ ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? 44 it would be for the national court to 
determine whether there had been a breach of Article 27 on the basis that enforcement of 
the judgment would bĞ “ĂƚǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞƚŽĂŶƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞĚĞŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĞŐĂůŽƌĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ
^ƚĂƚĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐƐŽƵŐŚƚŝŶĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐŝƚŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞƐĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚ ? Q ?within 
that legal order ? ?45 In referring to the earlier Opinion 2/94, the CJEU confirmed that its role 
was ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƚŚĞ “ůŝŵŝƚƐ ? 46 of public policy under Article 27 of the Brussels Convention 
ǁŚŝůƐƚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ ĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ĂĨĂŝƌ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ŝƐ  ?ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ?
fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed  Q ? 47   The Court 
confirmed that the public policy exception in the Brussels Convention could operate only in 
ƚŚŽƐĞ  “ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ĐĂƐĞƐ ? 48  ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ  “ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŽ ŚĞĂƌ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŚŽŝƐŶŽƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ Q ? 49  In conclusion, the Court of Justice affirmed 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨŵƵƚƵĂůƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŽ “ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂĨĂŝƌ
ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ Q ? 50   Therefore whilst it would appear that fundamental rights trump mutual 
recognition, the Court was affirming its previous position in C-49/84 Debaecker and Plouvier 
v Bouwman.51  In essence, a check and balance approach operates in that refusal to recognise 
the judgment of another Member State under the public policy exception takes effect only in 
such situations breach of an essential fundamental right as provided for by the national court 
of enforcement can be established. 
  
                                                          
43 Krombach, n 42 at para 16. 
44 Krombach, n 42 at para 31. 
45 Krombach, n 42 at para 37 ; words removed and italicised for emphasis. 
46 Krombach, n 42 at paras 1, 22, 23. 
47 Krombach, n 42 at para 42, words removed and added for syntax. 
48 Krombach, n 42 at para 44. 
49 Krombach, n 42 at para 44. 
50 Krombach, n 42 at para 43. 
51 Krombach, n 42 at para 43 ; C-49/84 Debaecker and Plouvier v Bouwman [1985] ECR 1779. 
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C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler ? ZĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŵƵƐƚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ  ?ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚůǇ
ĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞ ? 
The second key case brought under the Brussels I Regulation before the introduction of the 
Charter was C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler. 52  The dispute in Gambazzi was 
concerned with the compatibility of a freezing order, or Mareva injunction, with the Brussels 
I Regulation.  This freezing order was intended to prevent Mr Gambazzi from participating in 
court proceedings in which he was a defendant.  The Advocate General in Gambazzi took the 
view ƚŚĂƚ ƐƵĐŚ ĂŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ  “ŵŽƐƚ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ rights of the 
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?53   In Gambazzi, the court affirmed that the balance to be struck between 
fundamental rights and public policy was ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ  ? Q ? corresponded 
[with the] public interest pursued [and were not] disproportionate Q ? 54  In essence, the Court 
of Justice ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶ ƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ “ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? 55 to be used by national courts in 
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐƌĞŵĞĚŝĞƐ
and his right to be heard. 
Taking Account of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Case Law of the Court of Justice 
on the  Brussels I Regulation 2009-2014 
Prorogation of Jurisdiction and Coherence with Article 47: C-112/13 A v B 
In the case of C-112/13 A v B, 56 the Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria referred three questions to 
the CJEU which were concerned with the interaction between Articles 24 of the Brussels I 
Regulation and Article 47 of the Charter.  The facts were as follows.  A number of claimants 
ƐƵĞĚ ‘ ?ĨŽƌĚĂŵĂŐĞƐbased on the allegation that A was responsible for the abduction of  ?Ɛ
family members in a non-Member State.  dŚĞ ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ ? ǁĂƐ ĚŽŵŝĐŝůĞĚ ŝŶ
Austria and that the Austrian courts had jurisdiction.  The first question asked by the Austrian 
court was whether in a situation where national law is not compliant with the Charter, it 
should not be applied and referred for further, national assessment.  The second and third 
questions put to the Court was whether in circumstances where the defendant is absent and 
                                                          
52 C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler 2009 ECR I-02563. 
53 Gambazzi, n 52 at para para 33. 
54 Gambazzi, n 52 at para 29. 
55 Gambazzi, n 52 at para 39. 
56 C-112/13 A v B and Others, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), 11 September 2014 (not yet published). 
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a representĂƚŝǀĞŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƚŽĂƉƉĞĂƌ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ “ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ŶĐĞ ?- ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞďǇ “ƚĂĐŝƚ
ƉƌŽƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?57 of jurisdiction - for the purposes of Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation.  The 
third related question was whether such an interpretation of Article 24 of the Brussels I 
Regulation was in accord with Article 47 of the Charter.  The defendant argued that if 
appearance in this manner was established under Article 24, this would constitute a failure to 
take account of Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter.  In response, the claimants 
argued that if appearance was not established then this would be at odds with their right to 
an effective remedy under Article 47.  With regard to the first question, Advocate General Bot 
observed that whilst there was a lack of definition of appearance under Article 24, 58 Article 
 ? ?ǁĂƐƚŽďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?59  Advocate General Bot 
ǁĂƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞĂŶ “ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?60 ŽĨƚŚĞƌƚŝĐůĞĂŶĚĂ  “ŚŝŐŚ
level of prĞĚŝĐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?61 in relation to its potential effects on special jurisdiction rules, 62  
Article 24 in particular ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ “ŶĂƌƌŽǁůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚ ? ?63  Advocate General Bot was also of 
the opinion that in such cases, jurisdiction did not constitute the entry of an appearance by 
the defendant such as required by Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation and that tacit 
ƉƌŽƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶŵĂǇŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŽŶůǇŝĨ “ĂůůƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞ W and above all, the defendant 
 W ŚĂǀĞĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇĐŚŽƐĞŶƚŚĂƚũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?64  In relation to the third question, the Advocate 
General reaffirmed the need for deliberate choice, a point confirmed by the Court of Justice 
in its decision. 65  The Judgment of the Court also distinguished the earlier case C-327/10 
Hypotecní banka a.s 66 ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐĂƐĞƐŝŶĐĞ “ QƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƵŶĚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ůĂǁƚŚĂƚŵƵƐƚďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĞŶƚĞƌĞĚĂŶĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐĞŝƐĞĚ ? ?67 
  
                                                          
57 A v B, n 56 ; Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 2 April 2014, at paras 36, 39, 40, 41, 42. 
58 A v B, n 56 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, at para 35. 
59 A v B, n 56, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, at para 35. 
60 A v B, n 56, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, at para 35. 
61 A v B, n 56, Opinion of Advocate General Bot at para 37 ; affirmed in Judgment of the Court at para 57. 
62 A v B, n 56, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, at para 39. 
63 A v B, n 56, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, at para 38. 
64 A v B, n 56, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, at para 42. 
65 A v B, n 56 Judgment of the Court at para 53-54 et seq. 
66 C-327/10 Hypotecní banka a.s v Udo Mike Linder 2011 ECR I-11543. 
67 A v B, n 56, Judgment of the Court, at para 60. 
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Exclusive Jurisdiction: C-483/12 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber 
In the recent case C-438/12 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber,68 the Court of Justice was 
requested by the Oberlandesgericht Munchen, Germany to consider which court could assert 
jurisdiction under Article 22.  Article 22 provides exclusive jurisdiction for rights in rem over 
immovable property.  The related question was that if the court first seised did not have 
exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22, could the continuation of proceedings there 
potentially restrict recognition of a subsequent judgment under Article 35(1))?  The court was 
also asked whether, in accordance with the Regulation the court second seised - having 
exclusive in rem jurisdiction as the place where the object was situated - should stay 
proceedings in favour of the court first seised (lis pendens).  Advocate General Jääskinen re-
aligned the questions in the Preliminary Reference to follow the structure of the Regulation.  
In respect of the first question, he confirmed that the Italian courts as the courts first seised 
had already made a declaration declining jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute 
in favour of the German courts. 69  ^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ “ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚĨŝƌƐƚƐĞŝƐĞĚ ?ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
ďĞ ?ďĞĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ?70 the Advocate General confirmed that there was no lis pendens 
in operation in this case and proceedings in the court second seised need not be stayed.  He 
relied on dicta in Overseas Union Insurance 71 ƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ “ŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĨŽƌŝƚƚŽƐƚĂǇ
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐďĞĨŽƌĞŝƚ Q ?72  dŚĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞ “ƌĞůŝĂďůĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?73 this was 
premised on the fact that the court first seised did not have jurisdiction and could not 
therefore either determine the question of lis pendens nor issue a judgment capable of 
recognition under Articles 35(1) and 45(1).  Furthermore, since the court second seised may 
very well have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22, it would be unnecessary to require 
that court to stay proceedings. The Advocate General also provided an interpretation of 
Article 27 as to whether lis pendens required to operate  “between the same parties. ?74  In 
line with earlier jurisprudence, the Advocate General confirmed that it was possible for 
parties to have different procedural titles in each case and be at least one of the parties in 
                                                          
68 C-438/12 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber OJ C-159 16/05/14. 
69 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 17 of AG Opinion. 
70 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 37 of AG Opinion. 
71 C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance and Others [1991] ECR I-3317. 
72 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 40 of AG Opinion. 
73 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 42 of AG Opinion. 
74 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 17 of AG Opinion. 
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both sets of proceedings.  Both situations arose in this case: with the former criteria, one of 
the parties (Ms. I Weber) was a defendant to the first set of proceedings in Italy, whereas she 
was a claimant in proceedings brought against her sister (Ms. M. Weber) in Germany.  The 
Advocate General ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ Ă ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ  “ŶŽƚ ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĐĂů ? ?75 ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐĞĐŽŶĚƐĞŝƐĞĚƐƚŝůůŚĂĚƚŽďĞƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?interests are 
the same and insepĂƌĂďůĞ ? ?76   Crucially, for the purposes of this analysis, the Advocate 
General took the view that if the court second seised was not limited to determining the 
 “ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚŝŶĚŝǀŝƐŝďŝůŝƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?77 ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ?Ă “ĚĞŶŝĂůŽĨ
ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?78  ŝŶ ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ĨƵŶĚĂmental rights may occur.  The Advocate General 
confirmed that Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter are  
 “ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĞǆŝƐƚƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůŽƌůĞŐĂůƉĞƌƐŽŶ
concerned has interests inseparable from or identical to those of anotheƌƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? Q ?
An individual cannot be legitimately deprived of the opportunity of having his action 
examined without delay because another individual is the defendant in a dispute 
ďƌŽƵŐŚƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ?79 
In sum, the Advocate General concluded that in the present case the requirement to stay 
proceedings in the court second seised (which had exclusive jurisdiction) ǁŽƵůĚ “ũĞŽƉĂƌĚŝƐĞ
the effective judicial protection of the parties ?80 and that the proceedings in both the Italian 
courts and the German courts were not lis pendens and therefore not subject to Article 27. 
The Advocate General ĂůƐŽĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ƌŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽũƵƐƚŝĐĞ
[was] consistent with the right to effective juridical protection guaranteed by Articles 6 and 
 ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,Z ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚƐ ŽĨ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ?81 The 
Advocate General also remarked that in his/her opinion that the application of Article 27 
would not render a breach of Article 47 since it was plainly evident in this case that all parties 
had been able to access justice in their chosen courts. 
                                                          
75 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 53 of AG Opinion. 
76 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 54 of AG Opinion. 
77 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 53 of AG Opinion. 
78 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 55 of AG Opinion. 
79 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 55 of AG ?Ɛ Opinion. Words in brackets removed for 
syntax. 
80 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 58 of AG ?Ɛ Opinion. 
81 Irmengard Weber v Mechthilde Weber, n 68 at para 87 of AG ?Ɛ Opinion. 
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In response, the Court of Justice itself re-aligned the order of the questions referred to but 
nevertheless still ruled that a judgment granted by a Member State court that did not take 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƌƵůĞ ŝŶƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ?  “ǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ
MemďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? )ŽĨƚŚĂƚƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?82  The Court also agreed 
that in the circumstances of the present case  W the court second seised having exclusive 
jurisdiction - the issue of lis pendens did not arise. 83 
 
Compatibility of Service via Public Notice with Article 6 ECHR/Article 47 Charter : C-292/10 
G v Cornelius De Visser 
 
In C-292/10 G v Cornelius De Visser, 84 Ms G raised proceedings in the German Landgericht 
Regensburg court in which she sought to establish Mr De Visser ?Ɛ liability for infringement of 
her personality rights.  Mr Visser was alleged to have posted partly naked photographs of Ms 
G ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚDƐ' ?ƐĐŽŶƐĞŶƚon a website with a German top level domain address (.de) both of 
which were owned by him.  The difficulty in this case was that, despite investigations in 
Germany and the Netherlands, it was not possible to establish where Mr De Visser was 
domiciled (ie Germany, the Netherlands or somewhere else) and whether an eventual default 
judgment could be issued against him.  Ms G initiated proceedings via public notice in 
Germany.  There were a number of questions referred to the CJEU, a number of which were 
on the how Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation could be applied to such infringement 
claims. For this paper, the two key, competing issues were the compatibility of serving 
proceedings in this manner with the Brussels I Regulation and, in the absence of being able 
ƚŽĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵŝĐŝůĞ, ƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞŵĞĚǇ
under Article 47 of the Charter.  The Court referred to C327-10 Hypotecní banka 85  and 
confirmed that where there was no evidence that an EU citizen was domiciled in a non-
DĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐŽƵƌƚŽĨĂDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞŝƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ? Q ?
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐŽĨũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? Q ?ĂƌĞŵĞƚ ? ?86 On the 
                                                          
82 C438/12 Weber, Judgment of the Court at paras 48, 55. 
83 Weber, n82, Judgment of the Court at 62-64. 
84 C-292/10 G v Cornelius De Visser [2012] ECR. 
85 C-327/10 Hypotecní banka a.s, n 66. 
86 De Visser, n 84, Judgment of the Court at para 41. Words removed for syntax. 
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question of compatibility of the national procedural rules for public service of proceedings, 
the Court also ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƵĐŚ ƌƵůĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ  “ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶůĂǁ ? ?87 and  W in accordance with earlier CJEU authority from Denilauler 88 
and Gambazzi 89   W ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ĂƌĞ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ? ?90  With regard to the 
effective application of Article 47 of the Charter, the Court was also at pains to observe that 
that latter requirement  Wrights of the defence  W had to be balanced wiƚŚƚŚĞ “ĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚ
ƚŽďƌŝŶŐĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?91  
The Court of Justice offered a three point response. First, it reinforced Gambazzi that there 
could be occasions where the rights of the defence  “ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?92 
Second, in reinforced Hypnoteca ŝŶƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŚĂĚƚŽ “ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ  ? Q ? to 
ƚŚĞ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ŽĨ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?93  Third, in determining that such a restriction did not 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ  “ĂĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?94 it referred to Article 26(2) of the 
Brussels I Regulation which requires proceedings to be stayed where the defendant has not 
ŚĂĚ  “ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ƚŝŵĞ  ? Q ? ƚŽ ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞ  ?Ă ? defence or [take] all necessary steps ? ?95  Having 
considered the earlier CJEU case law, the Court then turned the ECHR case of Nunes Dias v 
Portugal 96 to reinforce the point that service by public notice could be effected provided 
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ,Z ǁĞƌĞ  “ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?97 This enabled the 
:hƚŽĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝǀĞůǇƚŚĂƚƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽ “ĂůůŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽns required by the principles of 
ĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŐŽŽĚĨĂŝƚŚĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ ? ?98 such service was compatible with Article 6 ECHR 
and Article 47 of the Charter. 
Protective Measures under the Brussels I Regulation : C-350/13 Antonio Gramsci Shipping 
Corp v Aivars Lembergs 
                                                          
87 De Visser, n 84 at para 45. 
88 C-125/79 Bernard Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frères, 1980 ECR 1153 at para 13. 
89 Gambazzi, n 52 at para 23. 
90 De Visser, n 84 at para 47. 
91 De Visser, n 84 at para 48. 
92 De Visser, n 84 at para 49; 
93 De Visser, n 84 at paras 49-50, words removed for syntax. 
94 De Visser, n 84 at paras 49 and 51. 
95 De Visser, n 84 at para 51 words removed and added for syntax. 
96 Nunes Dias v Portugal, 2003 Reports of Judgments and Decisions VI. 
97 De Visser, n 84 at para 58. 
98 De Visser, n 84 at para 59. 
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In C-350/13 Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Aivars Lembergs, 99 the question referred to the 
Court of Justice by the Latvian Court was whether it was compatible with the Regulation for 
the Courts of a Member State for a Mareva injunction 100 to be enforced in the courts of 
another Member State when damage to third parties may occur as a result of such 
enforcement. The Latvian Court asked two related questions.  The first question was related 
to Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation which provides that a judgment will not be 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ŝĨ ŝƚ ŝƐ  “ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚůǇ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ƚŽ ƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?The first question was whether the circumstances permitted the 
refusal to enforce a judgment in accordance with Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation?  If 
so, the second and related question asked by the Latvian Court was whether Article 47 of the 
ŚĂƌƚĞƌĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ůŝŵŝƚƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨĂƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŚŽŚĂƐ
not been a party to ƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? 101 if that person can apply for those proceedings to be 
 “ǀĂƌŝĞĚ Žƌ ĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ ? ?102  In the intervening time, the Mareva injunction had been 
withdrawn.  This plainly had the effect of negating the status of the case as one pending 
before the Courts of a Member State in accordance with Article 267 TFEU. 103 Whist the Court 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŝƚĐĂŶĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ?
ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?104 in accordance with Di Donna, 105 the Court plainly refused to give a ruling on 
the matter. The question therefore remains as to whether a Mareva injunction or similar 
procedural mechanism granted by the courts of a Member State, could legitimately constitute 
an infringement of the rights of third parties in breach of Article 47 of the Charter. 
Refusal to Recognise a Foreign Judgment and Article 47 of the Charter: C-619/10 Trade 
Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd 
 
In C-619/10 Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd, 106 the issue of whether there was 
Ă “ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂŶĚĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽĨ
the Charter was raised for the CJEU to consider.  In essence, this case raised a question about 
                                                          
99 C-350/13 Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Aivars Lembergs, Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber), OJ C261, 
11/08/14 ; L Collins, A Briggs, J Harris, JD McClean, C McLachlan and CGJ Morse (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins, 
The Conflict of Laws Sweet and Maxwell, 15th ed, 2012 at para 14-160. 
100 An order of the English court granted against an individual, having extraterritorial effect. 
101 Gramsci, n 99 at para 4(2). 
102 Gramsci, n 99 at para 4(2). 
103 Gramsci, n 99 at para 11. 
104 Gramsci, n 99 at para 9. 
105 C-492/11 Ciro Di Donna v Societa Imballaggi Metallic Salerno (SISMA) 27 June 2013 (not yet published). 
106 C-619/10 Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd, OJ C-331 27/10/12. 
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the competing priorities of mutual trust (a cornerstone of the Brussels I Regulation) on the 
one hand and the  “right to a fair trial under Article 47 of the Charter ? 107 on the other.  In this 
case a claim form was raised and served by the claimants for payment by the defendants. In 
the absence of the defendant lodging a defence, the English High Court granted a default 
judgment.  The claimants thereafter sought to have the judgment recognised and enforced in 
the District Court North Riga, Latvia. Article 54 (currently) provides that a person seeking 
enforcement of a judgment is required to present (in addition to a copy of the judgment) a 
certificate of enforceability from the court of a Member States where the judgment was 
issued. The claimant submitted a certificate in accordance with Article 54.  The relevant 
provisions in this case are Articles 34, which provides limited grounds to refuse the 
recognition of a foreign judgment and Articles 35, which confirms (inter alia) that the test of 
public policy does not apply to rules of jurisdiction, and Article 36 which confirms (inter alia) 
that the substance of a judgment cannot be reviewed. The Latvian court duly granted the 
application for recognition and enforcement and the defendant lodged an appeal. A further 
appeal was raised to the Senate of the Supreme Court, on the basis that recognition and 
enforcement should be refused due to firsƚ ? ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ  “ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŽĨ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ? ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ? ƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ lack of notice of English legal proceedings and, third, that the absence of reasons 
in the English default judgment ǁĂƐ “ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?108  
There were two questions referred by the Latvian Senate of the Supreme Court to the Court 
of Justice. The first question, in the case of a request for enforcement of a judgment from 
another Member State under Article 34 of Brussels I, was whether an enforcing court could 
consider evidence from the certificate as grounds to refuse recognition of a judgment granted 
in default of appearance and the compatibility of the need for mutual trust.  The Latvian 
Supreme Court started by looking at Article 54 and confirmed that whilst there was no 
requirement for the enforcing court to go beyond the information provided in the certificate, 
the (pre-Charter) case of C-283/05 ASML 109 ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ŽďƐĞƌǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨ
the defence of a defendant in default of appearance is ensured by a double review, also 
carried out by the court hearing the application for recognition or enforcement of the foreign 
                                                          
107 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 47. 
108 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 20. 
109 C-283/05 ASML [2006] ECR I-12041. 
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ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ? ?110  Interestingly, the Latvian Supreme Court also regarded there to be a 
connection between the infringement of Latvian public policy on the one hand and both the 
ECHR and the Charter.  It observed that both of the latter instruments necessitate that 
 “ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ŚĂǀĞĂŶ ?ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞir judgments the grounds on which they 
ǁĞƌĞĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ Q ?111   
/Ŷ ĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ŽĨ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ
 “ǁŽƌĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇƚŚĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ Q ?112  In the earlier 
decision C-420/07 Apostolides v Orams, 113 ƚŚĞ :h ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ  “ƐŚŽƵůĚ ?
where necessary, be able to appeal in an adversarial procedure against [a] declaration of 
enforceability if he considers one of the grounds for non-ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƚŽďĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ?114  The 
court confirmed that in line with the spirit of Recital 17 of Brussels I and the earlier case C-
139/10 Prism Investments 115 that the practical consequence of Recital 17 when the request 
for enforcement is made  “ŵĂǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞŽŶůǇĂƉƵƌĞůǇĨŽƌŵĂůĐŚĞĐŬŽĨƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ Q ?116 The 
Court pointed out that when the enforcing court issues a declaration in accordance with 
Article 42(2), Article 43 may then raise the issue of enforceability in the enforcing court.  The 
CJEU confirmed the earlier decision of ASML that ArtiĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ) “ĂŝŵƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐ
of defence of a defendant in default of appearance delivered in the Member State of origin 
ĂƌĞŽďƐĞƌǀĂďůĞďǇĂĚŽƵďůĞƌĞǀŝĞǁ ? ?117 It is at this stage that the court where enforcement is 
sought can, in accordance with C-166/80 Klomps v Michel 118  ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞ ĂŶ  “ŽǀĞƌĂůů ? ?119 
 “ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?120 of the facts, including whether the defendant was served with 
proceedings. The Court referred to the AG Opinion where it was remarked that the certificate 
ŚĂƐ  “ƉƌŝŵĂ ĨĂĐŝĞǀĂůƵĞ ?121 in so far as there are  W inevitably - different courts involved in 
issuing and enforcing a given judgment. 
                                                          
110 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 22. 
111 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 24. 
112 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 27. 
113 C-420/07 Meletis Apostolides v D.C Orams and L.E. Orams 2009 ECR I-03571. 
114 Apostolides, n 113 at para 43. 
115 C-139/10 Prism Investments BV v Jaap Anne van der Meer [2011] ECR I-09511. 
116 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 28 -29. 
117 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 32. 
118 Case 166/80 Klomps v Michel [1981] ECR 1593. 
119 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 33. 
120 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 38. 
121 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 36. 
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The second question was whether a decision in default of appearance that does contain 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐŝƐĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂĨair hearing in accordance with Article 
47 of the Charter.  Here, the Court of Justice made three significant points. The first reinforced 
the view from Apostolides v Orams ƚŚĂƚƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? )ǁĂƐ “ŵĂǇďĞƌĞůŝĞĚŽŶŽŶůǇŝŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?122 In asserting that Member States determine their own public policy objectives as a 
ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ƚŚĞ:h ?ƐƌŽůĞ - affirmed in a series of earlier cases  123 - ŝƐƚŽ “ƌĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐ
within which the courts of a Member State may have recourse to that concept for the 
purposes of refusing recognition Q ?124  Second, there ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƚŽ ďĞ  “ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ Ă
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ  ? Q ? ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ĂƐ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ŝŶ ƚŚĞů ŐĂů ŽƌĚĞƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐƐŽƵŐŚƚ Q ?125 The third, connected and concluding point was that the right to 
a fair trial under Article 47 is a coalescing ƌŝŐŚƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ  “results from the 
constitutional traditions common ƚŽ ƚŚĞ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ Q ?126 On that basis, the enforcing 
court may, as a starting point, regard a judgment lacking ŝŶ “ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚ-matter, 
basis and merits of the action, is a restriction on a fundamental right within the legal order of 
ƚŚĂƚDĞŵďĞƌ^ ƚĂƚĞ ? ?127  The Court confirmed that a range of factors that required to be taken 
ŝŶƚŽ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ  ? Q ? ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂů ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƐ  Q [availability of] an 
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƉƉĞĂů ?128) when determining whether the default judgment was 
manifestly disproportiate ƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚŽĨĂĨĂŝƌƚƌŝĂů ?/ŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƐƚŽ
recognition and enforcement and mutual recognition of judgments, a high threshold test 
would appear to be required. 
Enforcement of Judgments under the Brussels I Regulation and Article 47 of the Charter 
(I) C-156/12 GREP GmbH v Freistaat Bayern 129 
The question in this case was, in matters concerned with declarations of enforceability of a 
judgment under Article 43 of the Brussels I Regulation, does tŚĞ “ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽůĞŐĂůĂŝĚ ?130 form 
                                                          
122 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 48. 
123 Krombach n 42, C-38/98 Renault [2000] ECR 1-2973 and Apostolides, n 113. 
124 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 49-50, words italicised for emphasis. 
125 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 51. 
126 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 52. Words italicised for emphasis. 
127 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 54. 
128 Trade Agency, n 106 at para 60. Words removed and added for syntax. 
129 C-156/12 GREP GmbH v Freistaat Bayern, Order of the Sixth Court, 13 June 2012 (unpublished decision). 
130 GREP GmbH n 129 at para 23. 
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part of a pĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂĨĂŝƌƚƌŝĂůƵŶĚĞƌƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ and/or Article 6 ECHR? The 
CJEU confirmed the approach in C283/05 ASML 131 that a balance must be struck under the 
ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ/ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ “ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶ ?ŝŶŐ ? QƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ Q ?132  Once again, 
the rhetoric from the Court was clear; this balance must reflect effective judicial protection, 
itself to be ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚŝŶĨƵůĨŝůŵĞŶƚŽĨ “ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ
^ƚĂƚĞƐ Q ?133 and thereby the ECHR. In short, the CJEU held that there was a requirement to 
include legal aid within the criteria for assessing how a party could effectively bring a 
declaratory request under Article 43. Nevertheless, such a requirement could be subject to a 
restriction imposed by the court of enforcement, provided that such a restriction on the rules 
ŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐŽĨůĞŐĂůĂŝĚŝŶƚŚĂƚũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂƌĞŶŽƚ “ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂŶĚĚŝƐƉƌŽƉƌŝŽŶĂƚĞ ? ?134  Again, for 
the purposes of reviewing proportionality, the CJEU provided an instructive set of indicators 
of what connecting factors would be necessary for the national court of enforcement to 
review. These included the nature, gravity and legal basis of the proceedings, success rate and 
the procedural rules and costs applicable. 135 
(II) Preliminary Reference in C-4/14 Bohez v Wiertz 
In the recent case of C-4/14 Christophe Bohez v Ingrid Wiertz 136 6 January 2014, the Korkein 
oikes court in Finland made a Preliminary Reference on a number of key questions, two which 
two are most relevant for this analysis. The first, and general question, asked to the Court is 
whether an order to enforce and payment of a principal obligations in a child custody or 
access case is outside the scope of the Brussels I Regulation.  The second, and more particular 
question vis-à-vis fundamental rights  W relative to Recital 33 of the Brussels IIa Regulation and 
the right of access - asks the Court of Justice to confirm first, which court has jurisdiction to 
examine the issue of enforcement of a periodic penalty payment and second whether the 
ĐŽƵƌƚŽĨĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽĞŶƚĞƌŝŶƚŽ
an examination of the reasons for failure to comply with rights of access. In some respects, 
                                                          
131 C-283/05 ASML, n109. 
132 GREP GmbH n 129 at para 32. 
133 GREP GmbH n 129 at para 35 ; the court also referred to C-409/06 Winner Wetten GmhB v Mayor of 
Bergheim OJ C288/6 in support of this general principle. 
134 GREP GmbH n 129 at para 39. 
135 GREP GmbH n 129 at para 41 ; on costs the CJEU referred to C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- under 
Beratungsgesellscahr mbH c Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2010 ECR I-13849. 
136 C-4/14 Christophe Bohez v Ingrid Wiertz OJ C-71 08/03/14. 
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an analogy could be made with the Trade Investments case above, where the CJEU provided 
criteria as to how restrictions on defending the enforcement of a foreign judgment may be 
compliant with Article 47 of the Charter.  At the time of writing this Chapter a decision is 
awaited. It therefore remains to be seen to what extent the CJEU will consider this case in the 
context of a right of access case under Brussels IIa. This case may also provide the CJEU with 
an opportunity to clarify particularised set of criteria as to whether restrictions ŽŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ
powers to review a foreign judgment are not  “manifestly disproportionate ? to Article 24 of 
the Charter in the particular context of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
 
Conclusions 
It was the purpose of this chapter seeks to review a number of key Preliminary Rulings from 
the CJEU on the Brussels I Regulation in the period 2009-present.  It has been considered first, 
to what extent those decisions are illustrative of lex specialis generally in the field of judicial 
cooperation and specifically on fundamental rights. Second, where available, this chapter has 
sought to consider how the ' ?ƐKƉŝŶŝŽŶ in these cases may shed light on the future influence 
of the Charter in seeking to derive autonomous, independent interpretations of secondary 
EU Private International Laws. It is clear that Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is beginning to emerge as a distinct influence on the :h ?Ɛ interpretation of secondary 
EU measures for judicial cooperation in civil matters designed to advance the Treaty objective 
of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The role of the national court is clearly significant; 
both in terms of the continued referral of questions in Preliminary Rulings which seek 
clarification on influence of the Charter and in its eventual interpretation of those Rulings.  
The CJEU has responded by integrating the influence of the Charter into its interpretation of 
Articles of the Brussels I Regulation. Whilst a  “ŐƌĂĚƵĂůĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ? 137 is occurring, two wider 
issues persist.  The first issue is how the ideology of the Charter within the EU legal order will 
continue to restrict the mutual recognition of jurisdiction and judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. The second, related matter is that of effective interpretation.  Whilst not 
all the cases referred to contained an Opinion from the Advocate General, if the objective of 
the CJEU is to  “ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶ ŝƚƐ
                                                          
137 Trjstenjak and Baysen, n 9. 
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ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ Q ? 138 then, as de Burca attests, a more nuanced assessment of the  “ƌƵůŝŶŐƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌ
courts or on the relevant jurisprudence of regional and international bodies when interpreting 
and establishing human rights standards under the EU Charter of Rights ? 139 is necessary to 
ensure the tripartite relationship between national law, EU law and the Charter is firmly and 
expressly grounded in ƚŚĞ:h ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝǀĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? 
                                                          
138 De Burca, n 22 at p.184. 
139 De Burca, n 22 at p.185. 
